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Abstract
To prevent climate change, three options are currently considered: im-
prove the energy conversion efficiency of primary energy sources, develop
carbon free alternatives to polluting fossil fuels and abate potential emis-
sions before they are released inside the atmosphere. We study the optimal
mix and timing of these three mitigation options in a stylized dynamic model.
Useful energy can come from two sources: a non-renewable fossil fuel resource
and a carbon free renewable resource. The conversion efficiency rate of fossil
energy into useful energy is open to choice but higher conversion rates are also
more costly. The economy can abate some fraction of its potential emissions
and a higher abatement rate incurs higher costs. The society objective is to
maintain below some mandated level, or carbon cap, the atmospheric carbon
concentration. In the empirically relevant case where the economy is actually
constrained by the cap, at least temporarily, we show that the optimal path
is a sequence of four regimes: a ’pre-ceiling’ regime before the economy is
actually constrained by the cap, a ’ceiling’ regime at the cap, a ’post-ceiling’
regime below the cap and a final regime of exclusive exploitation of renewable
resources. If the abatement option has ever to be used, it should be started
before the beginning of the ceiling regime, first at an increasing rate and at
a decreasing rate once the cap constraint binds. The efficiency performance
from any source steadily improves with the exception of a time phase under
the ceiling regime when it is constant. Renewables take progressively a larger
share of the energy mix but their exploitation may be delayed significantly.
Absolute levels of carbon emissions drop down continuously but follow a non
monotonic pattern in per useful energy unit relative terms.
Keywords: energy efficiency; carbon pollution; non-renewable resources;
renewable resources; abatement.
JEL classifications: Q00, Q32, Q43, Q54.
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1 Introduction
Following the first oil shock of the seventies, policymakers have expressed
a strong concern for energy efficiency improvements. Numerous agencies,
plans and incentives have been created and designed to alleviate the effects
of high energy prices on welfare. If the economic relevance of such policy
initiatives has never been put into question, the same cannot be said of their
actual impacts. Many studies have shown that even given positive incentives,
households or firms may not adopt more energy efficient devices.1
However, whatever the alleged resistance of economic agents to become
more energy efficient, there is clear evidence that the overall energy effi-
ciency of industrialized economies has constantly risen in the last decades, as
an effect of dedicated policies or the mere working of market forces and the
respective dynamics of costs and benefits. The Figure 1 illustrates the past
and projected trend of US energy efficiency expressed in energy consump-
tion per GDP unit. It shows that between 1950 and 2010, primary energy
consumption per $ GDP has dropped more than a half and is expected to
continue to decrease in the next decades at an accelerated trend after the oil
shocks of the early seventies.
The fear of oil shocks has been replaced today by the concern for climate
change. Fossil fuels accounts for 87% of primary energy consumption at the
world scale and fossil fuel burning is the largest source of GHG emissions.
Raising energy efficiency of fossil fuel exploitation stands as a top priority in
carbon emissions mitigation. This is not the only option however.
Three main ways toward ’green’ energy systems are today on top of the
desk. The first one is energy efficiency improvements, resulting in less carbon
emissions release in the atmosphere per unit of GDP. The second one is the
substitution of fossil fuels use by other carbon free primary energy sources,
renewable or not: nuclear power, hydropower, wind and solar power, biofuels.
The transformation of these primary energy sources into useful energy raises
1The U.S. government has created a dedicated agency for energy efficiency, the Amer-
ican Council for an Energy Efficient Economy which publishes regularly reports on this
topic. Similar institutions exist in UK, France or Germany. For the energy efficient devices
adoption debate, see Brown, 2004, Allcott and Greenstone, 2012. For global estimates of
energy efficiency trends, see Schafer, 2005, Gillingham et al., 2009, IEA-OECD, 2013.
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Figure 1: US Past and Projected Energy Efficiency Trend.
also energy efficiency problems. As an example of such difficulties, it is
currently pleaded in the energy debate that renewables like wind or solar
being intermittent sources with low conversion performances, the economic
scope of these options should be rather limited. The third option is ’end-
of-pipe’ abatement of emissions and geological carbon capture and storage
(CCS) is currently viewed as the most promising technique in that respect.2
However, being still in infancy, the deployment of such abatement techniques
also raises strong efficiency concerns before becoming economically relevant.
For self-evident reasons, a lot of attention has been devoted to the co-
ordination failures faced by today governments trying to cope with a global
externality like climate change. But even in a fully cooperative world, the
design of an efficient policy agenda able to curb the current trend of GHG
emissions is not en easy task. One must take care of the temporal heterogene-
ity between policies, usually cast in the short run, and climate dynamics, a
set of complex evolutions extending well ahead the next centuries. Moreover,
available options to mitigate climate change interact themselves both in the
scale and time dimensions and thus should not be assessed in isolation, or on
the sole basis of their relative profitability at some given time. Such ’prof-
itabilities’, whatever might be their definitions, are jointly determined by
the relative competitiveness prospects of the mitigation options, themselves
depending on the climate dynamics and the climate policy agenda.
2See for example Budinis et al., 2016.
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In this context, we ask the following questions. How the various mitiga-
tion options previously outlined should be combined ? What should be the
right agenda of options in terms of relative scale and priorities? What will
be the consequences of fossil fuel scarcity on the optimal mix and timing of
mitigation options?
A lot of applied studies have explored the economic ’greening’ issue. Many
of them have relied on numerical simulation models at various space and time
scales. As an example, the Figure 2 shows projections from the International
Energy Agency about the desirable mix of different ’green’ options under an
atmospheric carbon concentration stabilization target in line with the +20C
objective:3
Figure 2: Mitigation Efforts to Meet the 450 ppmV Target.
As usual, it is hard to assess the reliability and the underlying economic
rationale for such figures. They suggest however that efficiency gains should
play a leading role in the mitigation efforts to meet the temperature rise
stabilization goal. But if the substitution options and the abatement options
have received considerable attention in the theoretical economic literature
on climate change management, this is much less true for energy efficiency
dynamics. Many models assume given and fixed efficiency rates for different
energy sources or introduce exogenous trends of efficiency improvements.4
3IEA/OECD, 2013.
4On the theoretical side, main original contributions are Farzin, 1996, Farzin and Tahvo-
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Efficiency gains being usually explained by technical progress, the issue
is hence accommodated inside the large body of literature devoted to tech-
nological advances and innovations. This is in particular the case for all the
recent works on so-called ’green’ R&D. In this literature, innovation improves
inputs efficiencies, in particular those of primary energy sources. But eco-
nomic efficiency is a slightly different concept than energy efficiency as used
in many empirical studies. One objective of this paper is to build a bridge
between these two concepts.5
To address these questions, we develop a stylized model summarizing
the main ingredients of the problem. Useful energy can be obtained from
two primary sources: a polluting non-renewable resource and a carbon-free
renewable resource. The exploitation of the non-renewable resource incurs
extraction costs increasing with past extraction. The conversion rate of fossil
primary energy into useful energy may be adjusted over time, but more
efficient energy converters are more costly to manage. The global economy
can also engage in emissions abatement, higher abatement rates being also
more costly to achieve.
As in Chakravorty et al. (2006), we assume that the economy wants
to maintain the atmospheric carbon concentration below a mandated level.
Under this stabilization constraint, we study how the economy should manage
the three options at its disposal to mitigate carbon emissions: raise the
energy efficiency performance of fossils, use more clean renewables or abate
some fraction of the potential carbon emissions before they are released in
the atmosphere.
In the interesting case where the economy would be at least temporarily
constrained by the carbon pollution mandate, we show that if the abate-
ment option has ever to be used, it must do so around the beginning of the
time phase under the carbon cap and be ended strictly before the economy
nen, 1996, Tahvonen and Withagen, 1996, Toman and Withagen, 2000. For more recent
contributions see Golosov et al., 2014, Van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2014. The applied
literature has intensively used IAM’s to assess climate policy options. Prominent contri-
butions are Gerlagh and Van der Zwaan, 2006, Stern, 2007, Nordhaus, 2008.
5The issue of technical change has quite naturally attracted a lot of attention in the
theoretical and empirical literature. See for example Manne and Richels, 2004, Gerlagh,
2004, Edenhofer et al., 2005, Grimaud et al., 2011, Hassler et al., 2012, Sorrell, 2014. Re-
cent contributions in the macro growth literature are Acemoglu et al, 2011, 2016, Smulders
et al., 2011, Van der Meijden and Smulders, 2018.
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can escape the constraint, a consequence of the time increasing costs of the
polluting non-renewable resource. The abatement rate should first increase
before the economy is constrained by the cap, second be constantly decreas-
ing during the constrained time period, and last be nil strictly before the end
of the constrained period.
Furthermore, the fossil energy conversion performance should steadily
improve with the exception of the last phase of the constrained period with-
out abatement, a phase during which the economy should maintain at a
constant level its energy conversion efficiency. The renewable option rises
progressively at the expense of the polluting non renewable option. The
combination of efficiency gains, substitution toward renewables and abate-
ment induces, with a stationary useful energy demand, a permanent drop
down of polluting emissions anyway insufficient in a first stage to prevent the
progressive accumulation of carbon into the atmosphere.
The rising costs of extraction of the non renewable resource imply that
some fraction of the initial resource endowment should remain permanently
stored underground, what we call the unburnable fossil resource stock. The
time increasing cost of fossil fuels extraction also induces a permanent rise
of the useful energy price until the complete transition toward green energy,
with the exception of the no abatement phase when constrained by the cap,
during which the energy price should be constant.
Section 2 presents our model of energy use and production. The opti-
mality problem faced by the society is laid down in Section 3. We focus on
the interesting case of an economy actually constrained by the atmospheric
carbon stock size, at least during some time period, a period we call the ceil-
ing regime. Section 4 studies the unconstrained time phases before and after
the ceiling regime. Section 5 describes the optimal behavior of the economy
under this regime. The main features of the optimal policies are presented
in Section 6. Section 7 focuses on the implications of limited carbon seques-
tration capacities. We examine in Section 8 the implications of alternative




We consider an economy in which the useful energy (U.E) can be produced
from two primary resources, a nonrenewable and potentially polluting one
(coal) and a clean renewable one (solar). Let respectively qx(t) and qy(t)
denote the instantaneous production rates of coal and solar U.E, (C.U.E and
S.U.E thereafter). Assuming that C.U.E and S.U.E are perfect substitutes
we may define the aggregate U.E production, denoted by q(t), as the sum of
both C.U.E and S.U.E productions: q(t) = qx(t) + qy(t).
Users gross surplus
The instantaneous gross surplus function of the final users, u(q), satisfies
the following standard assumption:6
Assumption A. 1 u : (0,∞) → R+ is twice continuously differentiable,
strictly increasing, u′(q) > 0, strictly concave, u′′(q) < 0, with u′(0+) = +∞
and limq↑∞ u′(q) = 0.
Alternatively we denote by p the marginal gross surplus u′, by p(q) ≡
u′(q), the inverse demand function, and by qd(p), the direct demand function,
the inverse of p(q) well defined under A.1.
Producing useful energy from coal
The coal sector includes two industries. The mining industry produces ex-
tracted coal from underground reserves and the coal transformation industry
produces C.U.E from extracted coal. Let X(t) be the stock of underground
stock available at time t, X0 be the initial endowment, X0 = X(0) and x(t)
be the instantaneous extraction rate: Ẋ(t) = −x(t).
Concerning its energy content, the stock of coal is assumed to be ho-
mogenous. But the deposits are more or less easily exploitable. Since inter-
6For any function f defined on X ⊆ R and for any x̄ ∈ X̄ where X̄ is the closure of X,
we denote by f(x̄+) and f(x̄−) respectively the limits, limx↓x̄ f(x) and limx↑x̄ f(x), when
such limits exist.
6
temporal cost minimization implies that the less costly deposit be exploited
first we may assume that the unitary extraction cost is some decreasing func-
tion of the not yet exploited stock X. Let a(X) be this function so that at
time t, the total extraction cost amounts to a (X(t))x(t). The function a(X)
satisfies the now standard assumption A.2:7
Assumption A. 2 a : (0, X0] → R+ is twice continuously differentiable
on (0, X0), strictly decreasing, a′(X) < 0, strictly convex, a′′(X) > 0, with
a(X0) > 0, a′(X0−) < 0, a(0+) = +∞ and a′(0+) = −∞.
Let ηx be this fraction of the extracted coal energy content converted into
U.E by the coal transformation industry (C.T.I thereafter) so that the C.U.E
production rate at time t amounts to qx(t) = ηx(t)x(t). Getting more U.E
from a given quantity of coal requires more costly industrial processes. Let
us denote by b(ηx) the processing unitary cost of the C.T.I extracted coal
input as a function of the efficiency rate ηx, hence a processing cost b(ηx)/ηx
per C.U.E unit, equal to the processing marginal cost.
We assume that b(ηx)/ηx is increasing, hence also b(ηx), and bounded
from above by η̄x < 1, since according to the second law of thermodynamics
some energy is necessarily lost in the transformation.8
Assumption A. 3 b : [0, η̄x) → R+ is twice continuously differentiable on
(0, η̄x), increasing, b′(ηx) > 0, strictly convex, b′′(ηx) > 0, with b(0) = 0,
b′(0+) > 0, b(η̄−x ) = +∞ and b′(η̄−x ) = +∞.
Producing U.E from coal requires not only coal but also other costly
inputs hence a positive marginal processing cost at 0+, implying, together
7See Solow and Wan (1976), Heal (1976), Lehvari and Liviatan (1977) and Hanson
(1980) for early analysis, and Cairns et al. (1998) and Hart (2016) for more recent devel-
opments.














hence b′(ηx) > 0 is necessary for db(ηx)/ηx > 0.
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with the continuity of b at 0, that: b′(ηx) > b(ηx)/ηx, ηx > 0. Hence b(ηx)/ηx
is increasing, and limηx↓0 b(ηx)/ηx = b′(0+) > 0.
The assumption b′(η̄−x ) = +∞ allows an easier computation of the quali-
tative features of the optimal paths. In the same spirit similar assumptions
will be postulated for the abatement cost function, g, and the solar energy
cost function, c, defined in the below paragraphs. We show in Section 8
that assuming a finite cost b′(η̄−x ), and finite values of g and c at the upper
bounds of their arguments do not alter the main qualitative characteristics
of the optimal paths.
Pollution
Burning coal to produce U.E generates a potential polluting emission flow.
Let ζ denote the unitary pollution content of coal so that potential emissions
would amount to ζx(t) when the C.T.I uses x(t) units of coal. The C.T.I
can abate some part of the potential flow. Let ηz(t) be the fraction of the
potential emissions which is captured and sequestered and z(t) the effective
flow feeding the atmospheric pollution stock: z(t) = (1− ηz(t)) ζx(t).
Let us denote by Z(t) the atmospheric pollution stock at time t, and by Z0
its initial level, inherited from the past: Z(0) = Z0. To simplify we assume
that the atmospheric stock is self-diluting at some constant proportional rate
α.9 Thus the dynamics of Z(t) is given by:
Ż(t) = z(t)− αZ(t) = (1− ηz(t)) ζx(t)− αZ(t) .
The atmospheric pollution stock must be kept at most equal to some
upper bound, or ceiling, Z̄, to prevent excessive damages like in Chakravorty
et al. (2006).10 The constraint is roughly equivalent to the +20 objective of
the COP 21, would the Paris agreement be enforceable.11 In order that the
9See Forster (1975), Farzin (1996), Tahvonen and Salo (1994), Tahvonen and Withagen
(1996) and Toman and Withagen (2000) for theoretical models in which α depends on Z.
Some such self-dilution processes give rise to strong non convexities, hence difficulties for
characterizing the optimal paths.
10The other standard formulation is to assume that the damages increase continuously
with the pollution stock. See Moreaux and Withagen (2015) for a recent study of the
optimal abatement policy in such a case but without the efficiency improvement option.
11Actually there exists some time lags between the CO2 concentration and temperature
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model makes sense we must assume that the initial stock Z0 is smaller than
the cap Z̄.
Abating the potential emissions is costly. Let g(ηz) be the unitary pro-
cessing cost of the potential emissions ζx to be incured by the C.T.I for
abating the fraction ηz of these emissions. The total abatement cost of ηzζx
amounts to g(ηz)ζx, hence an average cost g(ηz)/ηz per unit of abated pol-
lution, equal to the marginal cost. Higher abatement rates are technically
more difficult to achieve, thus more costly. Denoting by η̄z < 1 the upper
bound on feasible abatement rates, we assume that the function g(.) satisfies:
Assumption A. 4 g : [0, η̄z) → R+ is twice continuously differentiable on
(0, η̄z), strictly increasing, g′(ηz) > 0, strictly convex, g′′(ηz) > 0, with g(0) =
0, g′(0+) > 0, g(η̄−z ) = +∞ and g′(η̄−z ) = +∞.
The rationale underlying A.4 is the same than the rationale underlying A.3.
The assumptions b′(η̄−x ) = +∞ and g′(η̄−z ) = +∞ are simplifying assump-
tions.
We first assume in Sections 3-6 that there is no sequestration cost per se
and g(.) must be understood as a capture and sequestration cost. In Section
7 we develop the model and then g(.) will have to be understood as a pure
capture cost to which must be added a specific sequestration cost, a cost itself
depending upon the cumulative sequestered flow. The assumptions relative
to this development are laid down when needed, in Section 7. We show that
the main qualitative characteristics of the optimal paths are the same in both
versions of the model, hence the best is to begin with the most simple one.
Solar energy
The other primary resource is the solar radiation attaining the earth sur-
face. S.U.E production is a clean process generating no pollution to simplify,
in any case less than burning fossil fuels, in competition with the abatement
option to satisfy the CO2 concentration constraint, and presently beginning
increases. See Weitzman (2010) and Mason and Wilmot (2015) for the policy implications
of such lags.
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to be competitive since already unfold at a significant scale contrary to the
abatement device.
Concerning the S.U.E we do not detail the process of conversion of solar
radiation into U.E, neither the allocation of land among its different uses.12
We simply assume that the cost of S.U.E, denoted by c(qy), and its marginal
cost are both increasing functions of the production rate. Note that this cost
must include the loss incurred for diverting the land from other uses, thus
include the land rent, the equivalent of the mining rent in the production of
C.U.E.13 Let us denote by q̄y the upper bound on the S.U.E production rate,
then:
Assumption A. 5 c : [0, q̄y) → R+ is twice continuously differentiable on
(0, q̄y), strictly increasing, c′(qy) > 0, strictly convex, c′′(qy) > 0, with c(0) =
0, c′(0+) = c > 0, c(q̄−y ) = +∞ and c′(q̄−y ) = +∞.
Competitiveness of the coal sector
Absent any C.U.E production, the S.U.E industry is the only supplier of
U.E. Since the S.U.E is a renewable resource without stock effect, its optimal
production rate is the solution of the static problem max {u(qy)− c(qy)qy}.
Let q̃y be the solution of this problem, unique under A.1, A.5, then: u′(q̃y) =
c′(q̃y), and denote by p̃ the corresponding U.E price: p̃ = u′(q̃y).
In order that the C.U.E be ever competitive we must assume that for the
least costly grade of coal, X0, free of mining rent, exploited at the minimum
C.U.E average complete cost without emission levy, this minimum average
cost is lower than p̃. The minimum average complete cost is given by the
transformation rate, denoted by ηx(X0), solving min {(a(X0) + b(ηx)) /ηx}.















12A main other use of land is the production of food. See Amigues and Moreaux (2018)
for a detailed analysis of the allocation of land among food and U.E production.
13However there is some difference: At time t the land rent is the opportunity cost
incurred for diverting the land from other uses at the same date while the mining rent is
the cost incurred for diverting the coal from future uses.
10
that is, the marginal efficiency cost b′(ηx) must be equal to the minimum of
the average complete cost (a(X0) + b(ηx)) /ηx.14
Assumption A. 6 The C.U.E sector is competitive, that is:




Discounting and social welfare
The social rate of discount, ρ, is assumed to be positive and constant
through time. The social welfare is the sum of the discounted net surplus
provided that the CO2 atmospheric concentration be kept at most equal to
Z̄.
3 The social planner problem















{u (ηx(t)x(t) + qy(t))− a (X(t))x(t)− b(ηx(t))x(t)
−c(qy(t))− g(ηz(t))ζx(t)} e−ρtdt (3.1)
s.t. Ẋ(t) = −x(t) , X(0) = X0 > 0 given (3.2)
Ż(t) = (1− ηz(t)) ζx(t)− αZ(t) , Z(0) = Z0 < Z̄ given , Z̄ − Z(t) ≥ 0
(3.3)
x(t) ≥ 0, ηx(t) ≥ 0, ηz(t) ≥ 0, qy(t) ≥ 0 . (3.4)
Let λX and −λZ denote the co-state variables of X and Z respectively,
14A similar expression holds at any time t for the grade X(t) when coal is exploited.
See equation (3.10) infra.
15We omit the constraints X(t) ≥ 0, η̄x − ηx(t) ≥ 0, η̄z − ηz(t) ≥ 0, and q̄y − qy(t) ≥ 0,
which are never active under A.1-A.5.
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then the current value Hamiltonian reads:16,17
H = u(ηxx+ qy)− a(X)x− b(ηx)x− c(qy)− g(ηz)ζx
−λXx− λZ [(1− ηz)ζx− αZ] .
Denote by ν the Lagrange multiplier associated to the ceiling constraint
Z̄−Z ≥ 0, by γ’s the multipliers associated to the non negativity constraints
(3.4). Then the Lagrangian of the problem (S.P ) reads:
L = H + γxx+ γηxηx + γηyηy + γyqy + ν(Z̄ − Z) .
3.1 First order conditions
The f.o.c’s read:
w.r.t. x : u′(ηxx+ qy)ηx = a(X) + λX + b(ηx) + ζ [g(ηz) + (1− ηz)λZ ]− γx
(3.5)
w.r.t. ηx : u′(ηxx+ qy)x = b′(ηx)x− γηx (3.6)
w.r.t. qy : u′(ηxx+ qy) = c′(qy)− γy (3.7)
w.r.t. ηz : λZζx = g′(ηz)ζx− γηz , (3.8)
together with the usual complementary slackness conditions.
The condition (3.5) states that, when x > 0, hence γx = 0, the marginal
surplus generated by an additional unit of extracted coal converted into ηx
units of useful energy, u′ηx, must be equal to the full marginal cost of extrac-
tion, transformation, abatement and taxation, that is the sum of:
- the full marginal cost of coal extraction, a(X) + λX , the unitary ex-
traction cost, a(X), augmented by the mining rent associated to the
grade X;
- the marginal cost of transformation of one unit of extracted coal into
ηx units of U.E, b(ηx);
16By choosing −λZ as the co-state variable of Z, λZ appears as the shadow marginal
cost of the pollution stock hence as the optimal emission tax rate.
17We drop the time argument absent any ambiguity.
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- the full marginal cost of the potential pollution ζ of this additional
unit of coal input of the C.T.I when the fraction ηz is abated, that is
the abatement cost, g(ηz)ζ, augmented by the tax on the non-abated
pollution, (1− ηz)ζλZ .
The condition (3.6) states that the marginal surplus generated by a slight
increase, dη > 0, of the conversion rate of the extracted coal into U.E, u′dηx
must be equal to its marginal cost, b′(ηx)dηx. Note that when coal is ex-
ploited (3.6) reads more simply:
u′(ηxx+ qy) = b
′(ηx) =⇒ p = b′(ηx) . (3.9)
The condition (3.9) is nothing but than the profit maximization condition
w.r.t. ηx of the C.T.I when the coal input price is equal to a(X) + λX , and
the emission tax rate is equal to λZ , given an abatement rate ηz. The C.T.I
profit reads:




= 0 =⇒ p = b′(ηx) .




[a(X) + λX + b(ηx) + ζ (g(ηz) + (1− ηz)λZ)] . (3.10)
The equation (3.10) is the f.o.c on ηx for the minimization of the average cost
{a(X) + λX + b(ηx) + ζ [g(ηz) + (1− ηz)λZ ]} /ηx.18 As expected, the price is
equal to the marginal cost itself equal to the average cost.
The condition (3.7) states that the additional surplus generated by a
small increase of the S.U.E production must be equal to its cost when the
solar energy is exploited:
qy > 0 =⇒ u′(ηxx+ qy) = p = c′(qy) . (3.11)











This is the f.o.c on qy for the maximization of the profit of the S.U.E sector,
πy = pqy − c(qy).
Last (3.8) states that for a given tax rate λZ , the marginal cost of abate-
ment must be equal to the marginal cost of emissions, the non-abated po-






= 0 . (3.12)
This is also the f.o.c of the maximization of πc w.r.t. ηz.
3.2 Cost dynamics and unburned coal
When time differentiable, the dynamics of the co-state variables must satisfy
the following conditions:
λ̇X = ρλX −
∂L
∂X
: λ̇X(t) = ρλX(t) + a
′ (X(t))x(t) (3.13)
λ̇Z = ρλZ +
∂L
∂Z
: λ̇Z(t) = (ρ+ α)λZ(t)− ν(t), ν(t) ≥ 0, Z̄ − Z(t) ≥ 0,
and ν(t)[Z̄ − Z(t)] = 0 . (3.14)
Furthermore, λX , X, λZ and Z must satisfy the transversality condition:
lim
t↑∞
[λX(t)X(t) + λZ(t)Z(t)] e
−ρt = 0 . (3.15)
Since a′(X) < 0 then the current mining rent, λX , may be either increas-
ing or decreasing. However the full marginal cost of the extracted coal, that
from now we denote by ω, ω(t) ≡ a (X(t)) + λX(t), increases during the pe-
riod of coal exploitation. Substituting for λ̇X(t) its expression (3.13) in the
time derivative of ω(t), we get:19
ω̇(t) = −a′ (X(t))x(t) + ρλX(t) + a′ (X(t))x(t) = ρλX(t) > 0 .
(3.16)





−ρt} = a′ (X(t))x(t) < 0 .
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Let (t1, t2), t1 < t2, be a time interval during which the ceiling constraint
does not bind. Since Z(t) < Z̄, then, from (3.14) with ν = 0, the shadow
marginal cost of the CO2 stock must grow at the proportional rate ρ+ α:
Z̄ − Z(t) > 0 =⇒ λZ(t) = λZ(t+1 )e(ρ+α)(t−t1) , t ∈ (t1, t2) . (3.17)
For any optimal path along which the constraint binds, let us denote by
tZ and t̄Z respectively the first and the last date at which the constraint
is tight. We show later (Section 6, Proposition P.5) that the time interval
during which the constraint binds is unique, that is the whole interval [tZ , t̄Z ].
Furthermore the ceiling regime must end before the time tX at which the
extraction is closed.20 Since Z0 < Z̄, then tZ > 0, and since t̄Z < tX , then
from t̄Z on, the shadow marginal cost of the CO2 stock must be nil since the




(ρ+α)t , t ≤ tZ and λZ(t) = 0 , =⇒ ηz(t) = 0 , t ≥ t̄Z ,
where λ0Z ≡ λZ(0) . (3.18)
At time tX , or asymptotically if tX = +∞, λX(t) must be nil by the
transversality condition (3.15). Because the solar U.E becomes the only
available resource, the U.E price is equal to p̃ = u′(q̃y) where q̃y solves u′(qy) =
c′(qy). Then using (3.5) and (3.6) with u′ = p̃, λZ = 0, ηz = 0, g(ηz) = 0,
and γx and γηx both nil, we may determine the unburned stock of coal left
underground, denoted by X̃, as the stock which together with the conversion




and p̃ = b′(ηx) . (3.19)
The sequential determination of first η̃x, and next X̃, is illustrated in the
below figure 3.
In Figure 3, p̃ is given by the useful energy demand-supply matching in
the green economy, thus does not depend upon the costs in the extraction and
20Note that tX = +∞ is not excluded a priori since the marginal extraction cost depends
on the cumulated extraction, as pointed out by Salant et al. (1983).
21However we show also (see Proposition P.5) that the abatement of emissions ends
within the period at the ceiling, that is before t̄Z .
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Figure 3: Determination of the Optimal Terminal Transformation
Rate of Coal into Useful Energy, η̃x, and the Unburned Stock of
Coal, X̃.
coal transformation sectors. The optimal values of ηx is first determined as
the value η̃x at which the horizontal p̃ intersects the curve b′(ηx) (eq. (3.5) ).
Next consider the average cost curves I, II and III with respective minima
at ηxI , ηxII and ηxIII , corresponding respectively to XI > XII = X̃ > XIII ,
hence ηxI < ηxII = η̃x < ηxIII . The curve II is the only one for which the
minimum is located at ηxII = η̃x, hence the corresponding underground stock
XII = X̃ is the only stock for which the minimum of the average cost is equal
to p̃ (c.f eq. (3.5)) . The following characteristics of X̃ is worth to be pointed
out.
Proposition P. 1 Stranded coal.
Along an optimal path solving the social planner problem (S.P ) within
which the ceiling constraint is binding on some time interval, the coal stock X̃
to be left unexploited underground does not depend upon the unitary pollution
content, ζ, nor upon the cap Z̄ on the pollution stock, and nor upon α, the
self-dilution rate of the pollution stock.
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4 Dynamics during the unconstrained periods
During the unconstrained periods the dynamics of the flows are easy to de-
termine because either λZ = 0 or λ̇Z > 0 when λZ > 0, contrary to what
happens within the ceiling regime, during which the sign of λ̇Z is a priori
ambiguous (c.f. (3.14) with νZ(t) > 0).
Consider first a pre-ceiling phase or a post-ceiling phase with abatement
and S.U.E production. Since (3.6) holds with γηx = 0, we may substitute
b′(ηx) for u′ in (3.5) to get:
b′(ηx(t))ηx(t) = ω(t) + b(ηx(t)) + ζ [g(ηz(t)) + (1− ηz(t))λZ(t)] .(4.1)
Time differentiating the last term of the r.h.s of (4.1) and substituting g′(ηz(t))
for λZ(t) (from (3.8) with γηz = 0), we obtain:
d
dt
[g(ηz(t)) + (1− ηz(t))λZ(t)] = (1− ηz(t))λ̇Z(t) , (4.2)
so that time differentiating (4.1) results in:
η̇x(t) =
ω̇(t) + ζ(1− ηz(t))λ̇Z(t)
b′′(ηx(t))ηx(t)
> 0 . (4.3)




> 0 . (4.4)
Now restore u′(q(t)) instead of b′(ηx(t)) in the l.h.s of (4.1) and once again
time differentiate while taking (4.2) into account to determine q̇(t):
q̇(t) =
ω̇(t) + ζ(1− ηz(t))λ̇Z(t)
u′′(q(t))ηx(t)
< 0 ⇐⇒ ṗ(t) > 0 , (4.5)
and from (4.3)-(4.5) we get:





η̇x(t) < 0 . (4.6)




≥ 0 and d
dt
{ζ(1− ηz(t))x(t)} ≤ 0 , (4.7)
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with the strict inequality within a pre-ceiling period and an equality within
a post-ceiling period. The same qualitative results hold without S.U.E pro-
duction. To sum up:
Proposition P. 2 Dynamics during the unconstrained phases of coal
exploitation
Along an optimal path, during the unconstrained phases:
a. The transformation rate of the extracted coal into useful energy, ηx(t),
increases, the extracted coal input of the transformation industry, x(t),
decreases and the compound of both effects results into a decrease of the
coal useful energy production.
b. When the solar energy must be exploited, its production qy(t) increases
once started but this increase does not balance the decrease of the solar
useful energy production qx(t), hence the consumption of useful energy
q(t) decreases and its price, p(t), increases.
c. When pollution must be abated, the abatement rate, ηz(t), increases
once abatement starts and since the potential emissions, ζx(t), de-
crease, then the flow of pollution released in the atmosphere, ζ(1 −
ηz(t))x(t), decreases.
d. The shadow cost of pollution, λZ, is either nil or either positive and
time increasing.
5 The ceiling regime
As pointed out in the beginning of the above section 4 the problem during the
ceiling regime is that the sign of λ̇Z(t) is not known. Thus the direct method
developed for the unconstrained periods consisting in time differentiating the
f.o.c’s, next proceed to some substitutions to express the command variables
as functions of ω̇ and λ̇Z and last deduce from ω̇ > 0 and λ̇Z > / = 0 the
signs of the time derivatives of these command variables, cannot be used any
18
more. However when the abatement option is too costly we can exploit other
structural characteristics of the problem.
In what follows we denote by x̄(ηz) the maximum quantity of coal that the
coal transformation industry may use when the ceiling constraint is binding:











= 1− ηz .
(5.1)
5.1 Phases of the ceiling regime without abatement
Let us assume that the abatement is too costly so that ηz(t) = 0 hence
x(t) = x̄(0) = αZ̄/ζ. Then we may determine ηx and whether the S.U.E
must be used or not.
Would the S.U.E not be used, ηx would be determined as the solution of
(3.6) with qy = 0, that is:
u′ (ηxx̄(0)) = b
′(ηx) . (5.2)
Let ηcx denote the solution, then either u′ (ηcxx̄(0)) ≤ c′(0+) and qy = 0 is
optimal or u′ (ηcxx̄(0)) > c′(0+) and it is optimal to exploit the solar option.
In the case u′ (ηcxx̄(0)) ≤ c′(0+), then the optimal U.E production amounts
to qcx = ηcxx̄(0) and from (3.5) with ηz = 0, we obtain:
u′ (ηcxx̄(0)) η
c
x = ω + b(η
c
x) + ζλZ =⇒ λ̇Z = −ω̇/ζ < 0 . (5.3)
In the opposite case both the transformation rate ηx and the S.U.E pro-
duction rate qy are simultaneously determined as the solution of (3.6) and
(3.7):
u′ (ηxx̄(0) + qy) = b
′(ηx) and u′ (ηxx̄(0) + qy) = c′(qy) . (5.4)
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ηcx = ω + b(η
c
x) + ζλZ =⇒ λ̇Z = −ω̇/ζ < 0 . (5.5)
The Proposition P.3 sums up the results.
Proposition P. 3 Dynamics of the ceiling regime under uncompet-
itive abatement
Within a phase of the ceiling regime during which it is optimal to not
abate, hence during which the coal input of the coal transformation industry
is constant, x(t) = x̄(0) = αZ̄/ζ:
a. The transformation rate of coal into useful energy, ηx(t), must be kept
constant hence also the production of coal useful energy qx(t).
b. The production of solar useful energy, qy(t) (possibly nil), must also be
kept constant, hence the total production of useful energy, q(t).
c. Although the atmospheric CO2 stock is constant at the ceiling level Z̄,
its shadow marginal cost, λZ(t), decreases.
What remains to determine is the value of the constant sum ω + ζλZ .
But for that we need additional characteristics of the optimal path and must
wait up to the Proposition P.5 in the next Section 6.
5.2 Phases of the ceiling regime with abatement
Now we have to take into account that x̄(ηz) is evolving through time. To
overcome the difficulty we reformulate the problem that the society faces as
a static problem in which only the full marginal cost of coal, ω, is taken as
given, like in the preceding formulation of the Section 3, and next express
the command variables and λZ as functions of ω. Last, since ω̇ > 0 even
when the ceiling constraint is active (c.f. (3.16)) we determine the signs of
the time derivatives of the command variables and λZ during the phase of
the ceiling regime with abatement.
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5.2.1 Alternative formulation of the optimality problem
To determine its U.E consumption the society must simultaneously choose
the C.U.E-S.U.E mix, the transformation rate of coal into U.E and the pro-
portion of potential emissions to abate, under a maximum processed coal
constraint. Let (S.S.P ) be the static social planner problem to solve:22
(S.S.P ) maxx,ηx,ηy ,ηz u(ηxx+ qy)− ωx− b(ηx)x− c(qy)− g(ηz)ζx
s.t. x̄(ηz)− x ≥ 0 , ηz ≥ 0 and qy ≥ 0 .
Let us denote by µx the multiplier associated to the coal constraint and by
Lc the Lagrangian of (S.S.P ):
Lc = u(ηxx+ qy)− ωx− b(ηx)x− c(qy)− g(ηz)ζx+ µx [x̄(ηz)− x]
+γηzηz + γyqy .
The f.o.c’s are:
w.r.t. x : u′(ηxx+ qy)ηx = ω + b(ηx) + ζg(ηz) + µx (5.6)
w.r.t. ηx : u′(ηxx+ qy)x = b′(ηx)x (5.7)
w.r.t. qy : u′(ηxx+ qy) = c′(qy)− γy (5.8)
w.r.t. ηz : g′(ηz)ζx = µxx̄′(ηz)− γηz , (5.9)
together with the standard complementary slackness conditions.
The condition (5.7) relative to ηx is the same than the condition (3.6) in
the initial formulation of the (S.P.) problem for γηx = 0 and the condition
(5.8) relative to qy is the same than (3.7).
The conditions (5.6) and (5.8) are the new formulations of the initial
conditions (3.5) and (3.7) respectively. In (5.6) appears now µx instead of
ζ(1− ηz)λZ and in (5.9), µxx̄′(ηz) is substituted for λZζx in (3.8).
Note that in (5.6)-(5.9), x̄ = x̄(ηz) since the ceiling constraint is active by
assumption, hence µx > 0. The multiplier µx is the current shadow marginal
22Since the ceiling constraint is tight then x > 0 and ηx > 0, and we omit the corre-
sponding non-negativity constraints.
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cost of the ceiling constraint expressed here as a constraint over the maximum
coal input that the C.T.I may process.
5.2.2 Marginal cost of useful energy
a. Arbitrage between efficiency and abatement in the coal sector
Let us assume a fixed S.U.E production qy (possibly qy = 0). Then to
increase its U.E consumption by increasing its C.U.E production, the society
can resort to two policies: An increase of the efficiency rate ηx and/or an
increase of the abatement rate ηz to relax the constraint on the maximum
use of coal combined with an increase of the coal input.
Marginal cost of qx through increases of ηx
An increase dqx > 0 requires an increase dηx = dqx/x̄(ηz) of the trans-
formation rate and since the increase of the unitary transformation cost,
b′(ηx)dη − x, applies to the whole amount of processed coal, we get:
Marginal cost of qx = x̄(ηz)b′(ηx)dηx = b′(ηx)dηx . (5.10)
Marginal cost of qx through increases of ηz
With increases of the abatement rate ηz the marginal cost of qx includes
two components: The cost of extraction, processing and partial pollution
abatement of the additional coal input allowed by the increase of ηz, x̄(ηz)dηz,
and the increase of the cost of the abated pollution, ηzζx̄(ηz), induced by the
increase of the unitary abatement cost, g′(ηz)dηz.
An increase dqx > 0 requires an increase dηz = dqx/ηxx̄′(ηz) of the abate-
ment rate, hence:
- the cost of the additional coal x̄′(ηz)dηz to be transformed into U.E
amounts to:




[ω + b(ηx) + ζg(ηz)] dqx ;
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[ζ(1− ηz)g′(ηz)] dηz .
Summing up the two components, we get:
Marginal cost of qx =
1
ηx
{ω + b(ηx) + ζ [g(ηz) + (1− ηz)g′(ηz)]} dqx .
(5.11)
If it is optimal to abate, both marginal costs must be equalized so that,




{ω∗ + b(η∗x) + ζ [g(η∗z) + (1− η∗z)g′(η∗z)]} . (5.12)
b. Arbitrage between coal and solar energies
The marginal cost of solar energy is equal to c′(qy), hence:
- either the solar energy is too costly, that is:
b′(η∗x) ≤ c′(0+) , (5.13)
- or the solar energy is competitive, that is there exists q∗y such that:
b′(η∗x) = c
′(q∗y) . (5.14)
23Note that η∗z > 0 implies γηz = 0, hence (5.9) reduces to g′ = µx, and u′ = b′ by (5.7),
hence substituting g′ for µx and b′ for u′ in (5.6), we obtain (5.12).
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5.2.3 Dynamics at the ceiling with abatement
Assuming that it is optimal to abate and that the solar sector is competitive
while the ceiling constraint is binding, then (5.6)-(5.9) may be rewritten as:24








− b′(ηx) = 0 (5.16)
b′(ηx)− c′(qy) = 0 (5.17)
ζ(1− ηz)g′(ηz)− µx = 0 . (5.18)
Differentiating, and after some substitutions detailed in Appendix A.1,










































< 0 . (5.20)
































< 0 . (5.22)
It is easy to check that similar results hold for all the variables, qy ex-
cepted, when only coal is exploited. To conclude, since ω̇ > 0:
24(5.15)-(5.17) are obtained from (5.6)-(5.8) by substituting b′ for u′ (thank to (5.7))
together with x = x̄(ηz) = αZ̄/ζ(1 − ηz) in the arguments of u′. Next (5.18) is obtained
from (5.9) noting that x = x̄(ηz) and x̄(ηz)/x̄′(ηz) = 1− ηz (see (5.1)).
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Proposition P. 4 Dynamics of the ceiling regime under competitive
abatement
Within a phase of the ceiling regime during which it is optimal to abate,
hence during which the coal input of the coal transformation industry amounts
to x(t) = x̄(ηz(t)), ηz(t) > 0:
a. The transformation rate of coal into useful energy, ηx(t), must increase
while the abatement rate, ηz(t), must decrease inducing a decrease of the
quantity of coal processed by the coal transformation industry, x̄(ηz(t)).
On the whole this second effect dominates the first one and the produc-
tion of coal useful energy, qx(t), decreases.
b. When the solar energy sector is competitive, its production rate, qy(t),
must increase, but this increase is smaller than the decrease of the coal
useful energy production, qx(t), so that the consumption of useful en-
ergy, q(t), decreases.
c. Although the atmospheric pollution is constant, Z(t) = Z̄, its shadow
marginal cost, λZ(t), decreases.
6 Optimal paths
Combining the results of the Propositions P.1-P.4 together with the conti-
nuity of ω(t) and λZ(t) we conclude that all the optimal paths along which
abating the potential emissions is required have the following common struc-
ture.25
Proposition P. 5 Structural characteristics of the optimal paths with
abatement
Along any path:
25Under A.1-A.6 both λX(t) and λZ(t) are continuous according to Seierstad and Syd-
sæter (1987, Th 16, p 244), hence also all the paths x(t), qx(t), qy(t), ηz(t) on [0,∞) and
ηx(t) on [0, tX).
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a. If it is optimal to abate during some time interval [ta, t̄a), then the
ceiling constraint must bind during an interval [tZ , t̄Z).
Assuming that the ceiling constraint binds and that it is optimal to abate:
b. It is never optimal to start, next stop and last restart pollution abate-
ment. Abatement must be carried on during a single time interval
[ta, t̄a), ta < t̄a.
c. The ceiling constraint binds during a single time interval [tZ , t̄Z), 0 ≤
tZ < t̄Z.
d. Abatement must be started before the beginning of the ceiling period and
must be closed within the period: 0 ≤ ta < tZ < t̄a < t̄Z.
e. There exists a post-ceiling period [t̄Z , tX), t̄Z < tX (possibly tX = +∞),
during which coal exploitation must go on before the advent of the green
regime of exclusive solar energy consumption.
The proofs are given in Appendix A.2.
The only structural differences amongst the possible optimal paths lie:
- in the time ta at which the abatement begins, either immediately at
time t = 0, or later within the pre-ceiling period [0, tZ), according to
the abatement costs are low or high;
- and in the time ty at which begins the exploitation of the solar energy.
According to its costs be low or high, the solar energy production must
be started either before t̄a, the end of the abatement phase (possibly
ty = 0), or after t̄Z the end of the ceiling regime and then clearly
before tX , but never within the second sub-period at the ceiling, [t̄a, t̄Z),
during which all the command variables are constant, including the
solar energy production, nil or positive.
With the Proposition P.5 we are in position to determine the values of
of ω(t̄Z) and λZ(t̄Z), hence the constant value of ω(t) + ζλZ(t) during the
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no-abatement phase of the ceiling regime. During this phase of the ceiling
regime, x(t) = x̄(0). Immediately before the end of the preceding phase
also at the ceiling, at time t̄−a , λZ(t̄−a ) = g′(0+) by (3.8). Thus given that
ηx(t) = η
c
x and qy(t) = qcy (possibly qcy = 0), t ∈ [t̄a, t̄Z), determined in the
sub-section 5.1, then by continuity ω(t̄Z) must solve (3.5) with ηz = 0 and










ω(t) + ζλZ(t) = ω(t̄Z) + ζg
′(0+) , t ∈ [t̄a, t̄Z ] . (6.24)
An example of optimal scenario is illustrated in the Figures 4-7, in which
neither the abatement nor the production of solar energy begin immediately,
0 < ta and 0 < ty, but the solar energy production begins before the abate-
ment, hence also before the ceiling regime: 0 < ty < ta < tZ .
The U.E price path is illustrated in Figure 4 together with the shadow
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Figure 4: Optimal Paths of Useful Energy Price and Shadow
Marginal Cost of the Pollution Stock. Case 0 < ty < ta and tX <∞.
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The U.E price increases till the time tX at which ends the coal exploita-
tion, except for the second sub-period at the ceiling without abatement,
(t̄a, t̄Z), during which it is constant and denoted by pc in the figure. The
shadow marginal cost of pollution increases from an initially positive level,
λZ(0) > 0, up to a peak λZ(tZ) > g′(0+), at the beginning of the ceiling
period and next decreases during the ceiling period down to 0 at the end of
the period.
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U.E production
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q(t) = q̃y
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Figure 5: Useful Energy Production Rates. Case 0 < ty < ta and
tX <∞.
Except for the second sub-period at the ceiling, up to the time tX , the
beginning of the green energy regime, the production of coal U.E declines.
The consumption of the coal input by the C.T.I decreases because its price
increases and compensating improvements of the transformation rate ηx are
not sufficient to balance the input cutting down because higher transforma-
tion rates are also more costly. Once started the production of solar U.E
increases, except during the no-abatement episode at the ceiling, but not
sufficiently to wholly compensate for the coal U.E production fall, hence the
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U.E consumption decreases down to q̃ in the green regime.
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Abatement period
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Figure 6: Potential Emissions, Released Emissions and Abatement
Flows.
The path of potential emissions, ζx(t), mimics the path of the coal input
use, that is decreases up to time tX except within the no abatement interlude
at the ceiling during which it is constant. The released flow, (1−ηz(t))ζx(t),
is also decreasing except during the whole ceiling regime period. Before the
beginning of the abatement phase the released flow is equal to the potential
flow which is decreasing. With abatement before the ceiling regime, the po-
tential flow decreases whereas the abatement rate increases, thus the decrease
of the released emissions accelerates. Next during the first ceiling sub-period
with abatement, the potential flow decreases but the abatement rate also de-
creases. The result is that the released flow is constant and exactly balances
the self-dilution flow αZ̄. Within the second sub-period at the ceiling with-
out abatement, the released flow is again equal to the potential flow itself
equal to the self-dilution flow.
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Before the ceiling period, the released flow is larger than αZ̄. If not, since
Z0 < Z̄, and the potential flow is time decreasing, the ceiling constraint could
never bind. After the ceiling period the emission flow is lower than αZ̄ and
without abatement, so that Z(t) never comes back to the critical level Z̄.
Although the total emissions decrease, the emissions per unit of useful
energy follow a non-monotonic path as illustrated in Figure 7.
0
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Released pollution
per unit of coal U.E
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Figure 7: Released Emissions.
(1): per unit of coal useful energy
(2): per unit of useful energy
In the Figure 7 the path of emissions per unit of C.U.E is the top one.
During the initial phase without abatement, [0, ta), the ratio "released pollu-
tion/ C.U.E production" amounts to ζ/ηx(t) and since ηx(t) increases then
the emission content of coal U.E decreases.
Within the second phase with abatement and before the ceiling regime,









= −ζ [ηx(t)η̇z(t) + (1− ηz(t))η̇x(t)]
ηx(t)2
< 0 ,
so that the decrease of the released pollution per unit of C.U.E accelerates.
But within the next phase, the sub-period at the ceiling with abatement,
(tZ , t̄a), the released flow is constant, equal to αZ̄, while qx(t) decreases
resulting in an increasing unitary pollution level. The following phase (t̄a, t̄Z)
is characterized by a constant production qx(t) = qcx and a constant pollution
flow αZ̄, hence a constant unitary pollution content of the coal U.E. During
the post-ceiling period of coal exploitation, (t̄Z , tX), the ratio is again equal
to ζ/ηx(t), hence is decreasing down to some positive level.
The profile of the path of released pollution per unit of U.E (C.U.E +
S.U.E) is the same because q̇(t) and q̇x(t) have the same signs during the
different phases of the scenario. It is lower once the solar sector is active and
the discrepancy increases through time since the proportion of S.U.E in the
energy mix increases, except during the second sub-period at the ceiling, and
falls down to 0 at tX .
We may conclude from the non-monotonicity of the optimal polluting
content of C.U.E and U.E paths that mandates prescribing a decreasing
(possibly by step) unitary released pollution content of the useful energy
production are not a first best policy in the present model.
On the whole what could maybe seem surprising is that, as the time
is nearer the advent of the ceiling constrained regime, the abatement effort
must grow but, once the constraint binds, the effort must be progressively
relaxed down to 0 before the end of the ceiling regime. Hence the dominant
logic seems to be a sequentially dominant prospective one: As far as the
ceiling constraint is not yet hurting, the urgent problem is to prepare a not
too difficult constrained episode and, once constrained, the problem is also
to prepare the following unconstrained episode during which abatement is no
more useful, while maintaining a not too low U.E consumption.
These locally dominant effects translate to the global arbitrage scheme in
which the society is embedded. As time goes on, the increasing full marginal
cost of the non-renewable resource (extraction + mining rent) becomes the
globally dominant effect and progressively the acuteness of the ceiling prob-
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lem vanishes. However what remains surprising is that, during the second
phase of the ceiling regime the extraction rate of the non-renewable resource
together with its conversion rate must be kept constant, and also the pro-
duction of renewable energy, so that the energy mix must also be kept un-
modified.
7 Limited storage capacity of the captured pol-
lution
A well known limit of the abatement option is the disposability of favourable
sequestration sites, a highly debated issue.26 To take into account these lim-
ited availability of the sequestration sites and the fact that they are more or
less easily accessible we extend the model by introducing a specific seques-
tration cost h distinct from the capture cost g, as in Lafforgue et al. (2008-a,
2008-b).
Let us denote by S̄ the upper bound of the sum of the storage capacities
of the different sites, and by S(t) the not yet used sequestration capacity at
time t. Given that the captured pollution flow must be sequestered, then
S(t) = S̄ − ζ
∫ t
0
ηz(τ)x(τ)dτ . Like for the coal mines let us order the storage
sites by decreasing order of accessibility costs and denote by h(S) the unitary
sequestration cost of the abated pollution when the part S of the storage
capacity has not yet be filled. The function h(S) is assumed to satisfy the
following assumption A.7.
Assumption A. 7 h : [0, S̄) → R+ is twice continuously differentiable on
(0, S̄), strictly decreasing, h′(S) < 0, strictly convex, h′′(S) > 0, with h(S̄) >
0, h′(S̄−) < 0, h(0+) = +∞ and h′(0+) = −∞.27
26See Leung et al. (2014).
27Clearly the simple version of the model may be seen as a model in which the average
sequestration cost is constant, independent from the cumulative sequestration, and the
storage capacity is sufficiently large to not be saturated along the optimal path so that the
scarcity rent (constant in discounted terms in this case) is nil, that is: g(ηz) = ĝ(ηz) +ηzh
where ĝ(.) satisfies the Assumption A.4 and h is some positive constant, so that the total
abatement cost amounts to [ĝ(ηz) + ηzh] ζx. If ĝ(.) satisfies A.4 then g(.) also satisfies
A.4.
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Producing dirty coal U.E requires two natural resource inputs: a nonre-
newable one, coal, and a renewable one, the pollution stock which is self-
diluting. Producing clean coal U.E by capturing and sequestering the po-
tential pollution requires now the use of two nonrenewable inputs, coal and
sequestration capacity. The extra monetary cost induced by producing clean
coal U.E rather than dirty one amounts to (g(ηz(t))/ηz(t) + h(S(t)) per unit
of abated pollution at time t, to which must be added the rent corresponding
to the sequestration capacity.





{u (ηx(t)x(t) + qy(t))− a(X(t))x(t)− b(ηx(t))x(t)− c(qy(t))
− [g(ηz(t) + h(S(t))] ζηz(t)x(t)} e−ρtdt (7.1)
s.t. (3.2), (3.3), (3.4) and:
Ṡ(t) = −ζηz(t)x(t) , S(0) = S̄ > 0 given . (7.2)
Let us denote by λS the co-state variable of S, then the Lagrangian of
the problem is:
L = u(ηxx+ qy)− a(X)x− b(ηx)x− c(qy)− g(ηz)ζx− h(S)ζηzx− λXx
−λZ [(1− ηz)ζx− αZ]− λSζηzx+ ν[Z̄ − Z] + γxx+ γηxηx + γηzηz + γyqy .
The f.o.c’s (3.6) and (3.7) relative to ηx and qy respectively still hold, and
the f.o.c’s relative to x and ηz read:
w.r.t. x : u′(ηxx+ qy)ηx = a(X) + λX + b(ηx)
+ζ [q(ηz + (1− ηz)λZ + ηz(h(S) + λS)]− γx (7.3)
w.r.t. ηz : λZζx = [g′(ηz) + h(S) + λS] ζx− γηz . (7.4)
The dynamics of λX and λZ are unmodified, that is (3.13) and (3.14)
respectively still hold, and:
λ̇S = ρλS −
∂L
∂S
=⇒ λ̇S = ρλS + h′(S)ζηzx . (7.5)
28We omit the capacity constraint S(t) ≥ 0 which is never active under A.7.
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The transversality condition becomes:
lim
t↑∞
[λX(t)X(t) + λS(t)S(t) + λZ(t)Z(t)] e
−ρt = 0 . (7.6)
Like for the coal mines rent, the current sequestration sites rents, λS, may
be either increasing or decreasing during the period of pollution abatement
since in (7.5) the term h′(S)ζηzx is negative. However denoting by θ the full
marginal sequestration cost, θ ≡ h(S) + λS, we get:
θ̇(t) = ḣ(S(t)) + λ̇S(t) = −h′(S(t))ζηz(t)x(t) + ρλS(t) + h′(S(t))ζηz(t)x(t)
= ρλS(t) . (7.7)
The marginal sequestration cost increases when the society produces clean
coal U.E.29 Thus we may rewrite (7.4) as:
ηz > 0 =⇒ λZ(t) = g′(ηz(t)) + θ(t) . (7.8)
The cost of a slight abatement increase, ζxdηz, which amounts to [g′(ηz)
+θ]ζxdηz, must be equal to the saving of the shadow marginal cost of the
same pollution release, λZζxdηz.
Also, substituting b′(ηx) for u′(ηxx+ qy) thank to (3.6) which still holds,
we may rewrite (7.3) as:
b′(ηx) =
ω + b(ηx) + ζ [g(ηz) + ηzθ + (1− ηz)λZ ]
ηx
, (7.9)
a condition similar to (3.10) stating that the full average cost of the coal
transformation industry must be minimized.
Note that during the last part of the coal exploitation period it is no
more necessary to abate the pollution. Hence ηz, g(ηz) and λZ are all nil,
and the conditions determining the stock of unburned coal are the same than
the conditions (3.19) supra.
Like for the original model without specific sequestration costs we have
to take care of the indetermination of the sign of λ̇Z during the period at the
ceiling since (3.14) is still commanding the dynamics of λZ .





−ρt} = h′(S(t))ζηz(t)x(t)e−ρt < 0 .
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7.1 Dynamics during the unconstrained periods
Substituting b′(ηx) for u′ in (7.3) thank to (3.6) gets:
b′(ηx)ηx = ω + b(ηx) + ζ [g(ηz) + (1− ηz)λZ + ηzθ] (7.10)




(1− ηz(t))λ̇Z(t) + ηz(t)θ̇(t)
]
b′′(ηx(t))ηx(t)
> 0 , (7.11)
since during an unconstrained period, ω̇(t), λ̇Z(t) and θ̇(t) are all strictly
positive if ηz(t) > 0, or the two firsts are positive and the third one is nil
if ηz(t) = 0 but the ceiling constraint is still binding, or last the first one
is positive and λZ(t) is nil if ηz(t) is itself nil if the ceiling constraint never
binds thereafter.
Since the f.o.c. (3.7) relative to qy(t) does not change, we get the same
expression than (4.4) for q̇y(t) when qy(t) > 0;
qy(t) > 0 =⇒ q̇y(t) =
b′′ (ηx(t)) η̇x(t)
c′′(qy(t))
> 0 . (7.12)





(1− ηz(t))λ̇Z(t) + ηz(t)θ̇(t)
]
u′′(q(t))ηx(t)
< 0 ⇐⇒ ṗ(t) > 0 ,
(7.13)
and from (7.11)-(7.13) we get the same relation than (4.6) without seques-
tration costs:





η̇x(t) < 0 . (7.14)
Last let us show that the fraction of the potential emissions which is
abated increases during such a phase preceding the ceiling regime while the
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flow of pollution released in the atmosphere decreases. From (7.8), λ̇Z =
(ρ+ α)λZ and θ̇ = ρλS, we get:




ρ(λZ(t)− λS(t)) + αλZ(t)
g′′(ηz(t))
=
ρ [g′(ηz(t)) + h(S(t))] + αλZ(t)
g′′(ηz(t))




{ζ(1− ηz(t))x(t)} = ζ [−η̇z(t)x(t) + (1− ηz(t))ẋ(t)] < 0 . (7.16)
Note that (7.15) implies that during the unconstrained period preceding the
ceiling, once it is optimal to abate, the instantaneous increase rate of the
shadow marginal cost of the atmospheric pollution stock λ̇Z is larger than
the instantaneous increase rate of the full sequestration cost θ̇.
To sum up, all the qualitative properties of the dynamics of the uncon-
strained phases without sequestration costs are preserved when these last
costs are distinct of the pure capture costs. Let us show now that it is also
the case for the phases of the ceiling regime.
7.2 Dynamics during the ceiling regime
Phase at the ceiling with abatement
For this phase the analogous of the reduced system (5.19) is the following



































The matrix of the system (7.17) is the same than the matrix of the system
(5.19), hence the derivatives with respect to ω and the signs of the derivatives
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< 0 . (7.21)









< 0 . (7.22)
Since both ω̇ > 0 and θ̇ > 0 and because the signs of the derivatives
with respect to ω and θ are the same we may conclude that all the decision
variables moves through time in the same direction in both versions of the
model during the phase at the ceiling with abatement.
Phase at the ceiling without abatement
During such a phase (ηcx, qcy), the constant value of (ηx(t), qy(t)) is deter-
mined like in Sections 5 and 6. The reason is that without abatement the
f.o.c’s are the same in both versions of the model, since then ηz = 0, hence
g(0) = 0, λS(t) = 0 and ω(t)+ζλZ(t) = ω(t̄a)+ζλZ(t̄a), t ∈ [t̄a, t̄Z ]. The only
difference is that now λZ(t̄Z) is equal to (by (7.4) at t̄−a and the continuity
of λZ):
λZ(t̄a) = g
′(0+) + h(S(t̄a)) , (7.23)
30However note that the values of the arguments of the functions appearing in both
matrix (5.19) and (7.17) are not the same. Thus although the signs of the derivatives
dηx/dω and dηz/dω are the same their values are different.
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where S(t̄a) is the sequestration capacity which is left unfilled when the
abatement ends. The sum ω(t̄a) + ζλZ(t̄a), equivalently the sum ω(t̄a) +







= ω(t̄a) + b(η
c
x) + ζλZ(t̄a)







To sum up, we may conclude that the Propositions P.1 - P.5 are still valid
for this more developed version of the model.
8 Alternative upper bounds of the efficiency,
abatement and solar costs
To facilitate the analysis we have assumed that the costs, b, g and c tend
to infinity when ηx, ηz, and qy tend toward their upper bounds, respectively
η̄x, η̄z and q̄y. Assuming instead that they have finite values, b(η̄x), g(η̄z)
and c(q̄y), together with finite derivatives, b′(η̄−x ), g′(η̄−z ) and c′(q̄−y ) could be
empirically more relevant. Under this alternative assumption, the number of
different types of phase explode, according to ηx, ηz and qy are blockaded or
not at their upper bounds.31 However the multiplicity of phase types does
not translate into a too large number of qualitatively different optimal paths
because first, most phases have strong common features with the similar
phases of the initial model and second, the necessary continuity of the com-
mand and co-state variables severely limits the number of phase sequences
eligible to optimality.
The key features are:32
31There exist now 43 phase types: 18 before the ceiling regime, 18 during the ceiling
regime, 6 after the ceiling regime before the advent of the green economy and last the
green regime. For example, before the ceiling regime ηx may be blockaded or not, ηz may
be either nil, or positive and not blockaded, or last blockaded at its maximum η̄z, and the
same too for the solar energy production, hence 2× 3× 3 = 18 different types of phases.
There exist also 18 phase types in the ceiling regime, but after the ceiling regime ηz is
necessarily nil hence only 2× 3 = 6 kinds of phases.
32In what follows we index by the superscript ′b′ the time at which blockading begins
and ends. For abatement, tba and t̄ba are the times at which the abatement effort begins
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First ηx always increases except during two phases of the ceiling regime
(see the next key feature) up to be possibly blockaded at η̄x and then stay
blockaded up to the end of coal exploitation.
Second, if not blockaded before tZ , the beginning of the ceiling regime, ηz
is never blockaded because it begins to decrease once at the ceiling as in the
preceding scenarios. But if blockaded at η̄z before tZ it stays blockaded up
to some time t̄ba, ta < t̄ba < t̄a, at the beginning of the ceiling regime. In this
case the ceiling regime includes three successive phases: A first phase [tZ , t̄ba]
with ηz(t) = η̄z and x(t) = x̄(η̄z), a second phase (t̄ba, t̄a) during which ηz(t)
decreases from its maximum level η̄x down to 0 and as a consequence, x(t)
decreases from x̄(η̄z) down to x̄(0), and a last phase [t̄a, t̄Z) during which
ηz(t) = 0 and x(t) = x̄(0). The reason is that λZ(t) increases before tZ
even if ηz(t) is blockaded before tZ (c.f. (3.14) and (3.17)), hence at time
tZ : λZ(tZ) > g′(η̄−z ).33 Since λZ(t) is continuous there must exist some time
interval [tZ , t̄ba), t̄ba < t̄a, during which λZ(t) decreases down to g′(η̄−z ), and
after which ηz(t) enter the phase of decrease.34 Like in the last phase [t̄a, t̄Z ],
ηx(t) is constant during the first phase [tZ , t̄ba] hence also qx(t) = ηx(t)x̄(η̄z).
Third qy(t) increases once the solar option becomes competitive, except
during the initial phase at the ceiling with ηz blockaded if such a phase
exists, and the last phase of the ceiling without abatement, phases during
which qy(t) is constant. Since qx(t) too is constant then q(t) is constant hence
the U.E price. Thus the solar U.E may not begin to be competitive during
such phases. Last, when blockaded qy(t) stays blockaded forever including in
and ends to be at its maximum rate: ηz(t) = η̄z, tba ≤ t ≤ t̄ba. For ηx and qy, tbx and tby
are the dates at which ηx and qy begin to be blockaded. We may adopt these simpler
notations because once blockaded, ηx and qy never come back to unconstrained levels.
33With two constraints η̄z−ηz ≥ 0 and ηz ≥ 0 the Lagrangian of the problem (S.P ) must
include two components γ̄ηz[η̄z − ηz] and γηzηz so that the f.o.c (3.8) w.r.t. ηz becomes:
λZζx = g
′(ηz)ζx+ γ̄ηz − γηz , γ̄ηz ≥ 0 and γ̄ηz[η̄z − ηz] = 0 , and γηz ≥ 0 and γηzηz = 0 .
Hence when ηz begins to be blockaded before tZ , then at tZ , γη(tZ) = 0 and:
λZ(tZ)ζx̄(η̄z) = g
′(η̄−z )ζx̄(η̄z) + γ̄ηz(tZ) and γ̄ηz(tZ) > 0 .
34We show in Appendix A.4 that λZ(t) decreases when ηz(t) is blockaded at η̄z in the
ceiling regime and that during such a phase ηx(t) is constant, blockaded or not, and also
qy(t).
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the ultimate green regime.
Fourth during the pre-ceiling and post-ceiling phases the flow of pollution
released within the atmosphere is always decreasing even if either ηx, or ηz,
or both are blockaded because x(t) decreases.
To conclude, the differences between the present optimal paths and the
optimal paths of the initial specification of the model lie:
- in the possible never ending freezes of ηx and qy at η̄x and q̄y beginning
respectively at some time tbx and tby, tbx < tX and ty < tby < tX ;
- in a possible temporary freeze of ηz at η̄z during a time interval [tba, t̄ba]
beginning before the arrival at the ceiling and ending within the ceiling
regime: 0 ≤ ta ≤ tba < tZ < t̄ba < t̄a < t̄Z ;
- in that, except the phase [ta, t̄ba] at the ceiling with ηz blockaded and
the phase [t̄a, t̄Z ] at the ceiling without abatement, ηx and qy may begin
to be blockaded at whatever time of the coal exploitation period [0, tX)
according to b(η̄x) and c(q̄y) are high or low and, for sufficiently low
costs, the initial maximum rates, ηx(0) = η̄x and qy(0) = q̄y, may be
proved optimal;
- in that the abatement effort may begin to be blockaded at whatever
date of the interval [0, tZ), including the initial date t = 0, provided
that g(η̄z) be sufficiently low.
An example of optimal path along which ηz is blockaded at its maximum
η̄z while both ηx and qy are free, is illustrated in Figure 8. The S.U.E produc-
tion rate, qy, (not illustrated) becomes positive only during the post-ceiling
period, (t̄Z , tx), of coal exploitation.
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Figure 8: Optimal Path with ηz Blockaded, ηx and qy Free.
9 Concluding remarks
Among the three options commonly considered to mitigate the harmful im-
pacts of fossil energy use on climate change, two of them: fossil energy
efficiency improvements and energy transition to clean renewables, appear
clearly complement. All along the transition from fossil fuels to a green en-
ergy regime, the fossil fuel energy efficiency increases while renewables take
an increasing share in the energy mix, with the exception of the last phase
of the ceiling regime during which they stay constant.
The history of CCS deployment is more complex. If competitive, the CCS
option is used at an increasing rate before the ceiling regime but begins to
decline once this regime begins, the pollution abatement rate falling to zero
strictly before the economy can escape the carbon constraint. CCS stands
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as an interim option most valuable when the CO2 atmospheric concentration
approaches the cap and during the beginning of the ceiling regime.
The released flow of emissions decreases before and after the ceiling
regime, a time period during which it is maintained at the constant level
allowed by the carbon cap constraint. The fall of emissions is amplified by
the abatement activity before the ceiling regime. This is not the case in terms
of potential pollution per fossil energy units or total energy production units.
Although declining before the ceiling regime, the potential carbon pollution
per fossil and total energy units rises after the beginning of the ceiling regime,
next stabilises at the end of this regime before falling once again after the
end of the carbon constrained episode. This is a consequence of the progres-
sive fading out of the emissions abatement efforts during the first part of the
ceiling regime.
Our findings, initially obtained in a highly stylised setting are robust
to alternative formulations. We have shown that they remain qualitatively
valid after taking into account the limited availability of carbon sequestra-
tion sites both in size and cost accessibility or if technical limitations apply
to the energy efficiency gains or to the abatement rates of emissions. We
have assumed a stationary energy demand but an expanding demand would
mainly amplify the time evolutions of energy efficiency, energy transition and
abatement with the possible elimination of the constant phase before the end
of the ceiling regime.
The predictable difficulties to meet the objectives of the Paris agree-
ment suggest that the climate policy mix will combine carbon mitigation
and adaptation to climate change. The adaptation option should thus also
be included into the description of an optimal climate change management
policy. It is currently claimed that the cost gap of CCS could be filled by
sufficient learning-by-doing or technical progress in abatement techniques.35
More generally the innovation literature has largely emphasised the role of
technical progress in the transition toward a non-fossil based energy system.
We leave these issues for further research.
35See Amigues et al. (2016) for an analysis of the dynamic implications of learning-by-
doing in carbon pollution abatement.
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Appendix
A.1 Building up the reduced system (5.19)
In (5.6) let us substitute ζ(1− ηz)g′(ηz) for µx (from (5.6) and (5.9)) and b′
for u′ (from (5.7) ) to get:
b′(ηx)ηx − b(ηx)− ζ [g(ηz) + (1− ηz)g′(ηz)] = ω .
Differentiating results into:
b′′(ηx)ηxdηx − ζ(1− ηz)g′′(ηz)dηz = dω . (A.1.1)















dηz = 0 , (A.1.2)
hence, together with (A.1.1), (5.19) in matrix form.
A.2 Proof of the Proposition P.5
a. Abatement is required only if the ceiling constraint binds
Assume that pollution is abated during some time interval, (ta, t̄a) but
that sup{Z(t), t > ta} < Z̄. Then it is possible to save costs by reduc-
ing slightly the abatement while preserving the inequality, hence the non-
optimality of the path.
b. Unicity of the abatement period
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Let us assume that the pollution is abated during two separate intervals
∆′ = (t′a, t̄
′





> 0 , t ∈ ∆′ ∪∆′′






= g′(ηz(t)) > g
′(0+) , t ∈ ∆′ ∪∆′′
≤ g′(0+) , t /∈ ∆′ ∪∆′′ .
(A.2.1)
b.1 Assume first that the ceiling constraint does not bind within the in-




(ρ+α)(t−t̄′a) > g′(0+) , t ∈ (t̄′a, t′′a) ,
so that it would be optimal to abate within the interval, a contradiction.
b.2 Assume now that the ceiling constraint binds within an interval (t′Z , t̄′Z)
beginning before t′′a and consider the two cases t̄′Z > t′′a and t̄′Z ≤ t′′a.
b.2.1 Case: t̄′a > t′′a
In this case there would exist a first interval (t′′a − δ, t′′a), δ > 0 and suffi-
ciently small, at the ceiling without abatement followed by a second interval
(t′′a, t
′′
a+δ) at the ceiling with abatement. During the first interval, x(t) = x̄(0)
and during the second one, x(t) = x̄(ηz(t)) > x̄(0), and is decreasing by the
Proposition P.4-a (since ηz(t) decreases then x̄(ηz(t)) decreases during this
second time interval). This is possible if and only if x(t) jumps up at time
t′′a, but x(t) must be time continuous.36
b.2.2 Case: t̄′a ≤ t′′a
36From (3.6) and (3.7), ηx(t) and qy(t) have to be time continuous along an optimal
path since p(t) is time continuous, together with q(t). Thus qx(t) = q(t) − qy(t) is time
continuous and x(t) = qx(t)/ηx(t) is also time continuous.
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Note that abatement within (t′′a, t̄′′a) implies that there exists an interval
(t′′a, t̄
′′
Z), t′′a ≤ t′′Z < t̄′′Z , at the ceiling. If not it would not be optimal to abate
during the interval (t′′a, t̄′′a). Furthermore if t′′Z = t′′a, we are brought back to
the preceding case in which there exists a phase at the ceiling, the first part
of which before t′′a is without abatement and the second and following phase,




Thus let us assume that t′′a < t′′Z and show that x(t
′′+
a ) > x̄(0). If first
t′′Z < t̄
′′
a, then there exists a phase (t′′a, t′′Z) unconstrained with abatement
followed by a phase (t′′Z , t′′Z + δ), δ > 0 and t′′Z + δ < t̄′′a, constrained with
abatement. Within the whole interval (t′′a, t′′Z + δ), x(t) is decreasing (by
Propositions P.2-a for the first sub-interval (t′′a, t′′Z) and by Proposition P.4-a
for the second sub-interval (t′′Z , t′′Z + δ)) and because x(t) = x̄(ηz(t)) > x̄(0),
t ∈ (t′′Z , t′′Z + δ), since ηz(t) > 0, then x(t
′′+
a ) > x̄(0). The same kind of
argument holds if t′′Z ≥ t̄′′a. If t′′Z ≥ t̄′′a, then (t′′Z , t′′Z + δ), δ > 0 and sufficiently
small, is a phase at the ceiling without abatement during which x(t) = x̄(0)
preceded by either only one phase (t′′a, t̄′′Z) during which x(t) decreases, when
t̄′′a = t
′′
Z , or by two phases (t′′a, t̄′′Z) and (t̄′′a, t′′Z) respectively during which x(t)
decreases, when t′′Z > t̄′′a.
Let us come back to what happens before t′′a taking care that x(t
′′+
a ) >
x̄(0). First, if t̄′Z = t′′a, then (t̄′Z − δ, t̄′Z), δ > 0 and sufficiently small, is a
phase at the ceiling without abatement during which x(t) = x̄(0), so that
x(t) should jump up at time t = t′′a. Second, if t̄′a < t′′a, then there exist two
phases (t̄′Z − δ, t̄′Z) and (t̄′Z , t′′a), the first one during which x(t) = x̄(0) and
the second one during which x(t) decreases and by continuity of x(t), we get
x(t
′′−
a ) < x̄(0). Again x(t) should jump up at time t = t′′a.
c. Unicity of the ceiling period
Assume that there exist two successive disconnected periods at the ceiling,
[t′Z , t̄
′
Z ] and [t′′Z , t̄′′Z ], t′Z < t̄′Z < t′′Z < t̄′′Z , with an unconstrained period in
between: Z(t) < Z̄, t ∈ (t̄′Z , t′′Z).
c.1 Assume first that there is no abatement during the intermediate period
(t̄′Z , t
′′
Z). Then this period is an unconstrained period without abatement
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during which x(t) decreases according to the Proposition P.2-a, hence also
the emission flow ζx(t). Note also that at t = t̄
′−
Z , the abatement is nil. If
not λZ(t) would jump at time t = t̄′Z from some value larger than g′(0+)
down to some value at most equal to g′(0+). This implies that x(t̄′Z) = x̄(0).
Thus the emission flow is strictly lower than αZ̄/ζ during the intermediate
time interval so that Z(t), starting from Z̄ at time t̄′Z is strictly lower than
Z̄ during the whole intermediate interval. We conclude that Z(t) should
be discontinuous at t′′Z jumping from some level lower than Z̄ up to Z̄, an
impossibility.
c.2 Assume now that there is abatement during the intermediate period
(t̄′Z , t
′′
Z) while taking care that the abatement period is a unique time interval
(tZ , t̄a), according to the above Proposition P.5-b. Let us show that the
result is either an impossibility or a contradiction whatever the location of
the interval (ta, t̄a) with respect to the intervals [t′Z , t̄′Z ] and [t′′Z , t̄′′Z ]. Let us
consider the two cases t̄a ≤ t′′Z and t′′Z < t̄a.
c.2.1 Case : t̄a ≤ t′′Z
Consider first the case t̄′Z ≤ ta, implying that [t′′Z , t̄′Z ] is a period at the
ceiling without abatement so that x(t̄′Z) = x̄(0) = αZ̄/ζ sustaining the emis-
sion flow αZ̄. Then either ta = t̄′Z or t̄′Z < ta. If ta = t̄′Z , then the interval
(t̄′Z , t
′′
Z) is an unconstrained phase with abatement during which the emis-
sions decrease so that Z(t) < Z̄, t ∈ (t̄′Z , t′′Z), with Z(t
′′−
Z ) < Z̄ and at time
t′′Z , Z(t) should jump up, an impossibility. If t̄′Z < ta, then there exist two
successive intervals (t̄′Z , ta) and (ta, t′′Z), the first one unconstrained without
abatement and the second one unconstrained with abatement during which
the emissions decrease and again Z(t
′′−
Z ) < Z̄.
In the case ta < t̄′Z , then Z(t̄′Z) = Z̄ while Z(t̄
′+
Z ) < Z̄. This is possible
if and only if the emissions at time t̄
′+









Z) is an interval unconstrained
with abatement during which the emissions decrease by Proposition P.2-c,
hence again Z(t
′′−
Z ) < Z̄ and Z(t) should jump up at time t
′′
Z .
d. Abatement begins before the arrival at the ceiling and ends
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within the ceiling period: 0 ≤ ta < tZ < t̄a < t̄Z.
Let us first show that λZ(tZ) > g′(0+) if it is ever optimal to abate.
Assume that λZ(tZ) ≤ g′(0+), then by (3.17):
λZ(t) = λZ(tZ)e
−(ρ+α)(ta−t) < g′(0+) , t ∈ [0, ta] ,
and it is optimal to not abate during the pre-ceiling period. Next λZ(t)
decreases during the period at the ceiling according to Propositions P.3-c
and P.4-c so that λZ(t) < g′(0), t ∈ (tZ , t̄Z) and it is not optimal to abate
during this period. Last λZ(t) = 0, t > t̄Z , by (3.18) because the ceiling
constraint is no more active after t̄Z and again it is not optimal to abate
after t̄Z . To sum up, it is never optimal to abate.
Now assume that λZ(tZ) > g′(0+). First define ta, 0 ≤ ta < tZ , and
tZ = inf {t : 0 ≤ t < tZ and λZ(t) > g(0+)}. Then by (3.17), λZ(t) > g′(0+),
t ∈ (ta, tZ), and it is optimal to abate during the pre-ceiling phase (ta, tZ)
and at time ta if ta = 0 and λZ(0) > g′(0). Next note that λZ(t̄Z) = 0
since after t̄Z the ceiling constraint never binds again. Thus λZ(t) being time
continuous, there exists some time t̄a, tZ < t̄a < t̄Z , defined as t̄a = sup{t :
λZ(t) > g
′(0+)}, such that, λZ(t) being monotically decreasing on (tZ , t̄Z)
by the Propositions P.3-c and P.4-c, then λZ(t) ≷ g′(0+) according to t ≶ t̄a
and it is optimal to abate during the first ceiling sub-period (tZ , t̄Z) and not
during the second one, [t̄a, t̄Z ].
e. Existence of a post-ceiling period of coal exploitation: t̄Z < tX
Because the useful energy price path {p(t) = u′(q(t) , t ≥ 0} is contin-
uous, absent such a post-ceiling period (t̄Z , tX), we should have: p(t̄−Z) =
p(t̄+Z) = p̃, where p̃ = u
′(q̃y) and q̃y solves u′(qy) = c′(qy). Next because
p(t̄−Z) = p̃, then qy(t̄
−
Z) = q̃y and by the above point d. and the Propo-
sitions P.3-a and P.3-b, we get: p(t̄−Z) = u
′(ηx(t̄
−
Z)αZ̄/ζ + q̃y). Clearly
ηx(t̄
−





Z), hence a contradiction since
p(t) is continuous.
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A.3 Building up the reduced system (7.17)
With distinct capture and sequestration costs the problem (SSP ) of the
Section 5 must be rewritten as follows:37
max
x,ηx,ηz ,qy
u(ηxx+ qy)− ωx− b(ηx)x− c(qy)− [g(ηz) + ηzθ] ζx
s.t. x̄(ηz)− x ≥ 0 , , ηz ≥ 0 and qy ≥ 0 ,
where ω and θ are given.
The only f.o.c’s which have to be modified are the ones relative to x and
ηz. The system at stake is now:
w.r.t. x : u′(ηxx+ qy)ηx = ω + b(ηx) + ζ [g(ηz) + ηzθ] + µx (A.3.1)
w.r.t. ηx : u′(ηxx+ qy) = b′(ηx) (A.3.2)
w.r.t. qy : u′(ηxx+ qy) = c′(qy)− γy (A.3.3)
w.r.t. ηz : [g′(ηz) + θ] ζx = µxx̄′(ηz) + γηz (A.3.4)
where µx is the multiplier associated to the maximum extraction rate con-
straint x̄(ηz)− x ≥ 0.
Elimination of µx
Substituting x̄(ηz) for x in (A.3.4) with γηz = 0 since during the ceiling
regime with abatement the maximum coal input constraint is active and
ηz > 0, and taking care that x̄(ηz)/x̄′(ηz) = 1 − ηz according to (5.1), we
obtain:
µx = [g
′(ηz) + θ] ζ(1− ηz) (A.3.5)
Next:
- in (A.3.1) substitute b′(ηx) for u′(ηxx+ qy) thank to (A.3.2), next sub-
stitute the r.h.s. of (A.3.5) for µx and simplify;
37Like in Section 5, we omit the non-active constraints x > 0 and ηx > 0 since the aim
of the reformulation is to determine when it is optimal to abate while at the ceiling.
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- in (A.3.2) substitute αZ̄/(ζ(1− ηz)) = x̄(ηz) for x;
- assume that qy > 0 hence γy = 0 in (A.3.3) and substitute b′(ηx) for
u′(ηxx+ qy) again thank to (A.3.2),
to get the following system:








− b′(ηx) = 0 (A.3.7)
b′(ηx)− c′(qy) = 0 . (A.3.8)
Obtaining the reduced system (7.17)
Differentiate (A.3.6) and simplify to get:
b′′(ηx)ηxdηx − ζ(1− ηz)g′′(ηz)dηz = dω + dθ . (A.3.9)





and differentiate (A.3.2), substitute the r.h.s of (A.3.10) for dqy and divide














dηz = 0 .
(A.3.11)
The system (7.17) is (A.3.9) and (A.3.11) in matrix form.
A.4 Dynamics during a phase at the ceiling
with the abatement effort blockaded at its
maximum level η̄z
With this specification of the costs functions laid down in Section 8:
η̄x − ηx ≥ 0 , η̄z − ηz ≥ 0 and q̄y − qy ≥ 0 .
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the multipliers associated to the non-negativity constraints.
The Lagrangian of the modified (S.S.P ) problem, Lcm, is:
Lcm = u(ηxx+ qy)− ωx− b(ηx)x− c(qy)− g(ηz)ζx+ µx[x̄(ηz)− x]
+γ̄x[η̄x − ηx] + γxx+ γ̄ηz[η̄z − ηz] + γηzηz + γ̄y[η̄y − qy] + γyqy .
Assuming that only ηz is blockaded and that 0 < ηx < η̄x together with
0 < qy < q̄y, the f.o.c’s read:
w.r.t.x : u′(ηxx̄(η̄z) + qy)ηx = ω + b(ηx) + ζg(η̄z) + µx (A.4.1)
w.r.t.ηx : u′(ηxx̄(η̄z) + qy)x̄(η̄z) = b′(ηx)x̄(η̄z) (A.4.2)
w.r.t.qy : u′(ηxx̄(η̄z) + qy) = c′(qy) (A.4.3)
w.r.t.ηz : g′(η̄−z )ζx̄(η̄x) = µxx̄
′(η̄z)− γ̄ηz . (A.4.4)
Here we may not eliminate µx. What we obtain after the usual manipu-
lations is a reduced system in dηx, dµx and dω instead of the reduced system

































= −1 . (A.4.6)
Since ηx is constant then ηxx̄(η̄z) is constant and qy solving (A.4.3) neither
changes. Thus qx, qy, q and p are all constant.
With ηz blockaded at η̄z, the f.o.c relative to ηz in the initial (S.P ) prob-
lem, the equivalent of the above condition (A.4.4), would read:
λZζx̄(η̄z) = g
′(η̄−z )ζx̄(η̄z) + γ̄ηz . (A.4.7)
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= −x̄′(η̄z) < 0 . (A.4.8)
Thus, as asserted in Section 8, during such a phase, λZ(t) is decreasing since
dω/dt > 0.
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